Charging for irrigation water: The issues and options, with a case study from Iran. by Perry, C.J
Research Reports
IWMI’s mission is to improve water and land resources management for food, livelihoods
and nature. In serving this mission, IWMI concentrates on the integration of policies,
technologies and management systems to achieve workable solutions to real problems—
practical, relevant results in the field of irrigation and water and land resources.
The publications in this series cover a wide range of subjects— from computer
modeling to experience with water users associations— and vary in content from directly
applicable research to more basic studies, on which applied work ultimately depends.
Some research reports are narrowly focused, analytical, and detailed empirical studies;
others are wide-ranging and synthetic overviews of generic problems.
Although most of the reports are published by IWMI staff and their collaborators,
we welcome contributions from others. Each report is reviewed internally by IWMI’s own
staff and Fellows, and by external reviewers. The reports are published and distributed
both in hard copy and electronically (www.iwmi.org) and where possible all data and
analyses will be available as separate downloadable files. Reports may be copied freely
and cited with due acknowledgment.i i
Research Report   52
Charging for Irrigation Water:
The Issues and Options,
with a Case Study from Iran
International Water Management Institute
P O Box 2075, Colombo, Sri Lanka
C. J. Perryii
IWMI receives its principal funding from 58 governments, private foundations, and
international and regional organizations known as the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Support is also given by the Governments
of Pakistan, South Africa and Sri Lanka.
The case study included in this report is based on data made available by the Iranian
Agricultural Engineering Research Institute’s Field Office at Esfahan, as part of IWMI’s
collaborative program of research, funded by the Government of Iran, and benefited from
discussions with staff there and with Dr. M. Bybordi. Earlier drafts of the report were much
improved following general comments from Hammond Murray-Rust, David Seckler, Doug
Merrey, Intizar Hussain and Amanda Perry, and particularly detailed comments from Randolph
Barker.
The author: C. J. Perry is an IWMI Fellow, International Water Management Institute,
Colombo, Sri Lanka.
Perry, C. J. 2001. Charging for irrigation water: The issues and options, with a case study
from Iran. Research Report 52. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management
Institute.
/ irrigation management / productivity / water allocation / water use efficiency / maintenance
/ operation / cost recovery / user charges / water pricing / water shortage / economic aspects
/ political aspects / case studies / salinity / Iran /
ISBN 92-9090-427-5
ISSN 1026-0862
Copyright © 2001, by IWMI. All rights reserved.
Please direct inquiries and comments to: iwmi-research-news@cgiar.orgiii iii
Contents
Summary          v
Introduction           1
The Rationale for Water Pricing          1
Water Charges for Cost Recovery          3
Water Charges to Encourage Efficient Use          3
A Case Study: The Zayandeh Rud Basin, Esfahan Province, Iran         7
An Alternative Approach to Improving Productivity          14
Conclusions          14
Literature Cited          16ivv
Summary
Inadequate funding for maintenance of irrigation
works and emerging shortages of water are
prevalent. The use of water charges to generate
resources for maintenance and to reduce demand
is widely advocated. Examples from other utilities,
and from the domestic/industrial sectors of water
supply suggest the approach could be effective.
In developing countries, the facilities required
for measured and controlled delivery of irrigation
are rarely in place, and would require a massive
investment in physical, legal and administrative
infrastructure.
To be effective in curtailing demand, the
marginal price of water must be significant. The
price levels required to cover operation and
maintenance (O&M) costs are too low to have a
substantial impact on demand, much less to
actually bring supply and demand into balance.
On the other hand, the prices required to control
demand are unlikely to be within the politically
feasible range.
Furthermore, water supplied is a proper
measure of service in domestic and industrial
uses. But in irrigation, and especially as the water
resource itself becomes constrained, water
consumption is the appropriate unit for water
accounting. This is exceptionally difficult to
measure.
An alternative approach to cope with shortage
would focus on assigning volumes to specific
uses—effectively rationing water where demand
exceeds supply. This approach has a number of
potential benefits including simplicity,
transparency, and the potential to tailor allocations
specifically to hydrological situations, particularly
where salinity is a problem.
Data from Iran are presented to support these
contentions.1
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Introduction
and water services. A primary target for these
interventions is irrigation, because it is by far the
largest consumer of water—typically 80 per
cent—in most countries where shortage is a
problem.
In this report, we first set out some basic
issues related to the introduction of effective
water pricing for irrigation services. We argue
that implementation has a number of limitations
in the irrigation sector, and that the scope for
realizing benefits may be limited in relation to
the physical, economic, financial and political
issues of implementation. In the second part of
the report, readily available data from Iran are
used as a case study to support these
contentions.
The Rationale for Water Pricing
beneficiaries of irrigation—who typically are a
privileged group in most agrarian economies—
receive their service at the expense of the
economy in general,
1 as scarce public resources
are used first to finance project construction and
1Probably the most important benefit of irrigation is the overall reduction in food prices resulting from increased production. Thus the indirect
beneficiaries of irrigation, the consumers of cheaper food, should be happy to subsidize irrigation development through taxes. Within irrigated
agriculture, or within an individual project, however, the farmer who receives irrigation and benefits from it is clearly privileged in relation to a
farmer who does not receive irrigation water, and a service charge may be appropriate to recover a proportion of the benefits or to cover the
costs of the service.
Until recently, water has been plentiful in most
countries, and the role of water pricing as a
means to ensure efficient allocation and
productive use has attracted little attention.
Now, water is manifestly scarce in many
countries (Gleick 1996; Postel 1996; Seckler et
al. 1998); individuals, agencies and international
declarations advise that water should be treated
as an “economic good” (Briscoe 1996;
Rosegrant and Binswanger 1994; ICWE 1992;
Global Water Partnership 2000); in parallel with
this development, the maintenance of water-
related facilities is often observed to be
inadequate (Jones 1995). These two issues
together have provided an impetus for the
introduction of various forms of pricing for water
In some irrigation projects water is provided as a
free service. Elsewhere, even the low charges,
supposed to be collected are, in fact, not
collected (World Bank 1986). Where charges are
low, or not collected at all, the direct2
then to subsidize ongoing O&M. All too
frequently, the public subsidy is not forthcoming,
the project deteriorates, productivity falls, and
the scope for charging is reduced by the low
quality of the service—a classic vicious circle of
downward-spiraling performance.
Where charges are in place, the marginal
price is often zero—for example, where the
charge is fixed by crop or farm area, and does
not vary with the quantity of water actually used.
In this situation, even if the full costs of the
service are recovered, there is no incentive for
the farmers to save water—they will either take
as much as they want while the (fixed) price
allows a profit to be made, or not irrigate at all if
they cannot make a profit.
Inter-sectoral water transfers (for example,
reducing irrigation releases from a dam and
allocating the water for domestic use) offer the
appearance of greater simplicity and the
possibility to use “bulk” prices, but additional
difficulties arise here too. First, it is likely that
the value of water in domestic, industrial, and
commercial uses will be far higher than in
agriculture. IWMI’s research (Molden et al. 1998)
shows values of water consumed to be between
$0.03 and 0.90 per m
3. The value of water in
nonagricultural uses is typically at least double
the maximum agricultural value and, of course,
the value of water for human consumption in
times of extreme shortage is effectively infinite.
This leads analysts to believe that there is
scope for enormous increases in economic
benefit by market-based transfers of water from
low-value agricultural use to high-value new uses
in other sectors. The flaw in this argument, of
course, is that once rather small volumes of
water have been transferred to the high-value
uses, the marginal value falls sharply into
negative territory. The difference between dying
of thirst and drowning is less than a tubful of
water. And if inter-sectoral benefits of market
transfers are to be realized, then the entire
agriculture sector must be covered by
infrastructure, and bureaucracy required for the
measurement, billing, and transfer of water from
the least-productive parts of agriculture to the
more-productive areas. The potential costs and
benefits for Egypt have been analyzed (Perry
1995), and the likelihood is that costs would
substantially exceed the benefits.
It is clear from this brief introduction that
there are a number of reasons, each with
differing purposes, for recommending water
charges. The three most common are
· to recover the cost of providing the service
(either the full cost, including capital
expenses, or the ongoing O&M cost, or
some intermediate level)
· to provide an incentive for the efficient use
of scarce water resources
· as a benefit tax on those receiving water
services to provide potential resources for
further investment to the benefit of others in
society
Each of these three objectives requires
specific levels and structures of pricing to be
achieved. Here we concentrate on the first two—
as a means of cost recovery, and a means of
providing an incentive for efficient use.3
Water Charges for Cost Recovery
efficient use, and on the level of charges
required to achieve that goal. It is useful, first, to
establish a benchmark of the level of charges
that might be required to achieve recovery of the
service costs. Data in this area are scarce, and
we rely here on two studies that appear to be
exceptionally comprehensive and credible. The
first (ISPAN 1993) reviewed the situation in
Egypt, and concluded that the full cost of
irrigation and drainage O&M amounted to
US$52/ha in 1995 US dollars. This equates to
about $0.003 per m
3 of water delivered.
The second is a study prepared for the
World Bank’s appraisal of the Haryana Water
Resources Project (1995). It found the cost of
O&M to be $10/ha—again in 1995 US dollars—
which amounts to $0.002 per m
3. These studies
cover vastly different situations—Egypt having
an intensively managed system, delivering large
quantities of water to highly varied cropping
patterns, with very extensive drainage facilities.
Haryana’s system is very water-short—
availability is about one-third of that in Egypt,
management is extensive rather than intensive,
and drainage costs are minor. What the two
systems have in common is that they are both
successful and productive, and have been
operating for many years.
Water Charges to Encourage Efficient Use
The second objective adds further challenges. To
achieve an incentive for efficient water use, the
price of water must be directly related to the
volume delivered. Conceptually, this is identical
to an electricity meter where the consumer can
decide to switch off or switch on a particular
device, and experience a directly proportional
response in the electricity bill. Fortunately,
electricity reacts instantly once the demand at
the end of the wire is perceived, and the flow
down the wire can vary sharply without
operational consequence (except at the
generator). The water flow is rather slow in
canals, and must be issued well in advance of
distant demands. Changes in demand during the
period of distribution will result either in
Cost recovery requires a politically sensitive choice
as to the extent of cost recovery—full recovery of
capital and O&M costs at realistic interest rates, or
partial recovery at subsidized rates.
The assessed total cost of water supply (and
drainage) services must then be distributed
among various beneficiaries—farmers, villages
that receive domestic water supplies, flood
control downstream, and sometimes hydropower.
With this complex set of decisions made, a
specific target revenue from irrigators can be
defined. In fact, even this simple objective is
rather complex in reality because the costs of
O&M vary over time, especially when major
replacement or modernization work becomes
due, or when dealing with major events such as
floods, which may damage infrastructure.
Thus even this simplest of charging
structures will require political debate and
decisions, planning, predictions, and financial
management if a reasonably uniform pattern of
charging is to be maintained. In the State of
Victoria, Australia, irrigation systems are obliged
to project expenditures over a 100-year period
and adjust revenues to meet these with a stable
revenue stream (Langford et al. 1999).
In the next section, attention is focused on
the potential for using water prices to encourage4
shortages—if demand increases unexpectedly—
or in surpluses and spills if demand decreases.
We see already that transferring the electricity
paradigm to water delivery has significant
operational implications; if pricing of irrigation
water is to be effective in reducing demand in
surface irrigation systems, then specific and
comprehensive regulatory, operational and
economic criteria must all be met.
Regulatory Requirements
An orderly system of distributing water must be
in place through some existing and respected
regulatory framework for allocating water among
farmers—rules and procedures defining rights
and responsibilities; priorities in case of shortage
or excess supplies; penalties for breach of rules,
and so on. If this is not the case—or if
regulations are not observed (if farmers take
water at will, manipulate gate settings, tolerate
significant interference in water, or do not pay
assessed charges) then there is no immediate
scope for improving water distribution through
pricing, and attention should first be given to
clarifying and enforcing water rights and the
rules of water distribution. To then move on to
volumetric supply, as required for volumetric
pricing, additional procedures for both
measurement of the quantity delivered,
acceptable to the farmer and the billing agency,
and accounting for partial deliveries, missed
deliveries, excess deliveries, or late deliveries
must be in place.
Operational Requirements
If pricing is to encourage changes in the pattern
of demand at the level of the individual farm,
then system operations must be such as to
permit differentiated deliveries at this level. The
operational implications of delivering and
measuring a differentiated service at the level of
the individual farm poses significant difficulties in
many irrigation schemes, especially large surface
systems (which comprise the major users of
water). Such irrigation schemes comprise
hundreds, if not thousands or even millions of
individual consumers.
Measurement and charging at the farm level
will require substantial investments in equipment,
and an associated administrative bureaucracy to
collect and collate data on farm-level deliveries,
and undertake the billing process.
We recognize that there are procedures and
technical approaches to resolve this problem.
The approach has proved feasible in countries
such as Australia and the USA, but it is
important to recognize that farm sizes in both
these countries are typically 10 to 100 times
larger than those in many developing countries.
This directly indicates the associated additional
complexities of billing and also the far greater
hydraulic complexities of delivering (or not
delivering) incremental water supplies to
individual farmers. The hydraulic complexity
results from the fact that changes in flow rates
at one point in an open surface system generate
impacts on all downstream flows, which can be
dealt with, but using rather different infrastructure
than most systems now have. In Israel, while
farm sizes are often comparable to those in
developing countries, the infrastructure is mostly
such as to allow precise and verifiable delivery
of water to individual farms—and the concept of
scarcity was dominant in the original system
design rather than emerging over time (as is the
case in many existing systems). We see very
few large-scale irrigation systems in developing
countries where the providing of infrastructure for
such service would not involve effectively
reconstructing the system.
An alternative approach in the context of
developing countries, to avoid the “small farm”
problem, is to deliver water to an intermediate
point—a farmer organization, a lateral, or a
village—on the basis of volumetric pricing, and
allow the farmers to distribute the water5
“internally.” This has the attraction, from the
agency’s viewpoint, of devolving the most difficult
part of the operation (the actual interface
between “supply” and “demand”) to others—a
common feature in many participatory
management approaches. But the overall
management task of delivering differentiated
supplies to individual farms remains, as indeed
does the required regulatory framework, the need
to measure and bill, and so on. If these aspects
are missing then the direct link between service
and payment is lost, and the efficiency incentive
that pricing is designed to produce is neutralized.
Economic Requirements
If the charging system is to have an impact on
consumption, then the system of payment must
be such as to induce the desired economic
response. We can usefully distinguish between
two desired responses; the first is simply to
make the user aware of an incremental charge
related to incremental use, and to encourage
avoidance of waste. This is analogous to the
small cost incurred in leaving a light on—we are
conscious of it, we will tend to avoid leaving
lights on for long periods during daylight hours,
but may leave lights on at night for the
convenience of finding a stairway well lit rather
than having to seek the switch in the dark.
The second objective of marginal pricing is
actually to achieve a balance between supply
and demand through the pricing mechanism—in
other words, to find that price that will optimize
demand for and allocation of any given
availability of water. This, of course, is a far
more complex pricing objective because the
value of water varies very sharply by crop, by
stage of growth, and by soil type, and most
difficult of all, depending on whether it has
rained, is raining, or will rain soon.
Which objective of pricing is sought—to
balance supply and demand or simply to reduce
demand—must be very clearly understood in the
process of designing a pricing system.
If the objective of marginal water pricing is
to balance supply and demand, then the price
charged must be significant in relation to the
benefits derived from using water. As noted
above, IWMI’s research has shown that the
value of water consumed in agriculture ranges
from $0.05 to 0.90 per m
3, with the great
majority of observations falling in the order of
$0.10–0.20 per m
3. We can assume, on this
basis, that prices of less than a few cents per
cubic meter will have little effect on demand.
Indeed, research has shown in the case of
Egypt (Perry 1995) that the price required to
induce a 15 percent fall in demand for water
would have reduced farm incomes by 25
percent.
If the objective is simply to reduce demand
to some unspecified degree, then two further
issues must be considered: first, it will be
necessary to have additional quantitative
controls on supply (because the proposed price
will not achieve the necessary balance); and
second, the question of the balance between the
cost incurred to induce the intermediate fall in
demand and the actual water “saved” should be
considered. In this case, the water saved
through pricing is zero (because the level of
consumption is determined by the quantitative
controls, which would work perfectly well in the
absence of pricing).
The Issue of “Saving” Water
One final problem plagues the achievement of
efficiency benefits through irrigation water
pricing, even if infrastructural, operational,
political and bureaucratic hurdles can be
crossed. This issue concerns the nature of
“efficiency” in water resource systems.
In the municipal and industrial sectors of
water supply, the agency providing the service6
appropriately considers the volume and quality of
water delivered as measures of service. This is
appropriate because the agency will have paid to
capture the water, treat it to meet specified
standards, and deliver the water through its
distribution network. Reductions in demand from
users will save the agency money on each of
these activities. Also if users waste water by
taking more than they need to fulfill a particular
objective, the agency (or another agency
downstream) would again have to capture, treat,
and distribute this water—incurring further costs.
But when basin-level resource scarcity
becomes the framework for analysis (rather than
sector-specific cost accounting) the picture
changes dramatically: we must focus not on
water diversions, but on consumption, and
recognize that where “wasted” water is
recaptured downstream, the resource cost of the
“wastage” is essentially zero unless substantial
pollution has occurred in the recycling process.
An approach to addressing “efficiency” and salt
pollution has been suggested elsewhere (Keller
and Keller 1995). In the context of overall water
shortage it is not diversion, but consumption—
through evapotranspiration, pollution, or loss—
which is the concern.
We have already argued that it is difficult to
envisage a system of accurate measurement of
deliveries to farms in large-scale irrigation
systems in developing countries. The
measurement of consumption is inherently much
more complex because it involves spatially
distributed return flows to drains, rises and falls
in local water tables, rainfall, and so on.
In some cases, moreover, excess water
delivered during one season recharges an
aquifer, which provides water in a subsequent
dry season when there may be no alternative
supplies, and indeed the water is considerably
more productive. Such situations are common: in
parts of China, India and Pakistan, the area
irrigated by wells is comparable to (and in some
areas, more than) the area irrigated by surface
supplies—but many of these wells are in
surface-irrigated commands and thus depend
substantially on recharge from surface “losses.”
In all heavily developed basins, with more than
one diversion point on the river, a proportion of
the “losses” from upstream projects forms
inflows to downstream projects.
In any of these circumstances, an increase
in “efficiency” will reduce the flows to the aquifer,
drain, or river, by roughly the same amount as
“losses” have been reduced. This is entirely
desirable where the aquifer is saline, or so deep
as to be beyond economic recovery, or where
drainage flows cannot be recaptured for
downstream use. In some cases, the effective
loss in terms of productive potential may
sometimes, on further examination, turn out to
be far greater than initially estimated when
excess water picks up local salt from the soil
and returns this extra polluting load to the
river—reducing potential productivity
downstream.
We believe that this complex situation makes
it virtually impossible to formulate a pricing
structure that can serve the multiple objectives
of water charges, and the various hydrological
situations where it may be desirable to
decrease, stabilize, or increase the water
supplied to irrigation systems. Certainly charging
for water can give incentives, but broader
objectives of balancing supply and demand or
stabilizing environmental impacts are unrealistic.
Even the introduction of incentives will require
massive improvement in the infrastructure,
management and regulatory framework that
characterizes most irrigation systems.7
Water Charges and Water
Consumption
As outlined above, to assess the potential
impact of pricing water, a number of issues must
be addressed:
· the nature and extent of water “losses”
and potential savings
· the cost of “saving” water and the cost of
surface supplies
· the cost of water and its value to farmers
· the impact of charges on water demand
· salinity and salinization
This disaggregation is attempted below.
The Nature and Extent of Water
“Losses” and Potential Savings
How much water can reach and be consumed
by the crops out of what has been stored,
diverted, conveyed, delivered and applied to the
field is central to project planning, and the day-
to-day operation of irrigation systems. “Losses”
in this process—the quantities of water released
from storage that do not reach the crop—are the
legitimate concern of the operators and
beneficiaries.
A Case Study: The Zayandeh Rud Basin, Esfahan Province, Iran
The Zayandeh Rud basin (figure 1) has an area
of about 4 million hectares, of which 8 percent
(300,000 ha) is irrigated—about 3 percent
(130,000 ha) under surface irrigation in large,
government-constructed schemes drawing from
the Zayandeh river, and the rest in small
groundwater or kanat-supplied areas that are
privately owned and operated.
Annual rainfall in the irrigated areas is 100–
200 mm and annual ET is in the range of
1,500–2,000 mm, so irrigation is essential for
agriculture. Presently available surface water
resources from the Zayandeh river, augmented
by interbasin transfers, total 14 billion m
3. These
resources are essentially fully consumed by the
existing facilities, and residual flows reaching the
Gavkhuny marsh are limited in quantity, and of
unusable quality. With the exception of small
areas with positive recharge from nearby hills,
the groundwater balance is marginal, and in
some areas consumption exceeds recharge.
The Zayandeh Rud basin is thus extremely
short of water, and the distribution of available
supplies is unequal in terms of both quantity and
quality. Projects drawing from the river in the
upper reaches are relatively plentifully supplied
with good quality water; rice is a common crop
and irrigation intensities are high. Moving
downstream, irrigation supplies decline both in
quantity and quality until the lower reaches
where the quality of water from the river
becomes marginal—and eventually unusable.
Farmers supplement deliveries by pumping from
groundwater and drains, wherever such water is
fit for use, and in some cases by using water of
extremely poor quality.8
But two separate and often coexistent
features dramatically alter the appropriate
perspective once resource planning (rather than
project planning, or local management) is the
objective. These features are reuse of “losses,”
and basin-level competition.
Commonly, for surface irrigation schemes
such as those found in Iran (Bybordi 1989), the
ratio of water delivered to the project to the
water consumed by crops is about three to
one—that is, for every 3 m
3 delivered at the
head of an irrigation system, only 1 m
3 is
transpired by the crop. In such a case, the
“efficiency” would be calculated as 33 percent,
and 67 percent would be assumed to be “lost.”
Reuse of losses occurs most commonly
when
FIGURE 1.
The Zayandeh Rud basin.
· seepage from canals and fields reaches
aquifers that can be exploited
· farmers recover water from local drains
· the outflow from drains flows to a river that
has downstream diversion works
However, a critical examination of local
conditions may show that the potential to
recover such “losses” is limited by existing
recycling—which may be active (wells; pumping
from drains) or passive (drains flowing to the
river and on to downstream diversions; capillary
rise from shallow water tables to support
crops)—in other words, the losses are already
being recovered!9
The Cost of “Saving” Water and the
Cost of Surface Supplies—Incentives
at the Farm Level
Water delivered to the farmer goes to one of
three uses: it is utilized by the crop, runs off
the field into a drain, or percolates to the water
table. The farmer benefits from the first of
these uses, and may suffer—through
waterlogging or leaching of nutrients—from the
other two.
If the price of water delivered to the farm is
increased, the farmer will have an incentive to
reduce his or her demand for water by reducing
the water going to the drains and to the aquifer.
First, it is important to note that the
farmer’s incentive to reduce losses is linked
only to those losses that are within his or her
control while overall irrigation system losses
may amount to 60–70 percent. In Iran as
elsewhere, typically less than half of these
occurs at farm level, the rest being operational
losses, and seepage from main and distributary
canals. Thus the farm-level losses may amount
to 30 percent of the water supplied to the
project—even less if some of this excess
delivery is recovered for further use.
Table 1 calculates the cost per m
3 of
reducing required water deliveries by investing
in improved irrigation technology at $1,000 per
ha—a typical figure in Iran for the installation of
sprinkler systems. The cost per m
3 saved is
shown in the second column ($0.11 per m
3 for
year-round, and $0.14 per m
3 for single-season
irrigation), based on the assumptions about
Crop Demand, Losses, and Costs detailed in
the columns to the right.
Year-round irrigation has a higher total cost
of operation ($348 compared to $220), but
lower cost per unit of water saved (about $0.11
per m
3 compared to 0.14 per m
3) because the
fixed costs are distributed over a larger number
of units. For both situations (year-round and
single-season, the sensitivity of the cost of water
saved is tested by increasing and decreasing
each parameter by 20 percent. For example, if
the losses before the improvement are 20
percent higher (i.e., 36%) in the single-season
situation then the cost of water saved falls to
$0.10 per m
3; while if the losses are lower by 20
percent, then the cost of water saved increases
to $0.21 per m
3.
The calculations indicate that the cost to the
farmer of water saved through improved on-farm
technology will be in the range of $0.08–0.21 per
m
3 depending on the total volume delivered and
the costs of investment and operation.
Taking the minimum cost ($0.08 per m
3),
which applies for the case of maximum water
deliveries, it is interesting to compare this to the
current price of irrigation water, which is 20 Rial
per m
3, or $0.004 per m
3. If volumetric prices
are to be used to induce farmers to invest in
improved on-farm technology to save water, then
water charges would have to exceed $0.08 per
m
3—a 20-fold increase—for the investment in
on-farm water management to be profitable.
This, in turn, would result in water charges of
about $400 per ha for a crop such as wheat
(with current yields of around 5 t per ha and a
price of $120 per t, water charges would
account for two-thirds of gross revenues).
These calculations indicate that for basic
field crops, the cost of saving water through
investment in improved irrigation technology is
unattractive, and the cost of surface water would
have to be increased enormously to make such
investment an attractive alternative to purchasing




Gross and net values of production for major crops.
Crop Land Irrigation Harvest Total Yield Price Gross Gross Net Net
preparation pesticides costs costs (t/ha) (R/ton) value of value of value of value of
seed (R/ha) (R/ha) (R/ha) production production production production
(R/ha) (R/ha) ($/ha) (R/ha) ($/ha)
Wheat 350,000 500,000 150,000 1,000,000 6.5 650,000 4,225,000 704 3,225,000 538
Barley 350,000 350,000 150,000 850,000 6.0 500,000 3,000,000 500 2,150,000 358
Maize 350,000 500,000 200,000 1,050,000 6.0 500,000 3,000,000 500 1,950,000 325
Rice 2,500,000 500,000 1,000,000 4,000,000 5.5 1,750,000 9,625,000 1,604 5,625,000 938
Note: R = Iranian Rial. US$1.00 = R6,000 (in 1993).
TABLE 1.
Cost of reducing water deliveries by improved irrigation technology.
Cost of Crop Losses Losses Reduced Capital Interest Life Capital Operational Total
water demand before after delivery cost % (years) cost/yr. cost cost
 ($/m
3)( m
3/ha) (%) (%) (m
3/ha) ($/ha) ($) ($/ha/yr.) ($/ha/yr.)
Two season 0.11 10,000 30 10 3,175 1,000 10 10 148 200 348
Cost/m
3 for...
+20% 9 8 12 12 11 11 14
-20% 14 17 10 10 11 12 8
Single season 0.14 5,000 30 10 1,587 1,000 10 15 120 100 220
Cost/m
3 for ...
+20% 12 10 15 15 15 13 16
-20% 17 21 13 12 14 15 1311
The Cost of Water and Its Value to
Farmers
The value of water to farmers is an extremely
complex issue. The marginal value of water
varies sharply through the season—water to
complete the development and harvest of a
nearly mature, high-value crop will have a very
high value; additional water after an irrigation, or
rainfall may have a negative value.
The average value of water (value of crop
divided by total water used) is more stable, and
is a useful indicator of the general value of water
to farmers. Even here there are many
complexities:
· The net value of the crop depends on
valuation of the crop itself and cash inputs,
any or all of which can be significantly
distorted by market imperfections or taxes/
subsidies.
· The valuation of noncash inputs such as
land, family labor and draft animals, is
extremely difficult.
· The basis for computing water consumption
may be water diverted to the project; water
applied to the field; or water actually
consumed by the crop (values that, as
indicated above, may vary by a factor of
three).
Table 2 summarizes data from Esfahan on
typical yields of major crops. Gross values of
production range from about $400 to about
$1,600, while net values are generally some 30
percent lower.
IWMI has made extensive studies of the
gross value of water per unit of water applied
and per unit of water diverted and consumed.
These values range from $0.03 per m
3 for rice
(water applied) to $0.50 per m
3 (water
consumed) for vegetables and fruits. Typical
gross values per unit of water consumed range
from $0.10 per m
3 to $0.20 per m
3, and these
values compare well with data from Zayandeh
Rud for a range of crops, as shown in table 3,
which is based on the crop budgets from table
2, and the calculated water requirements for the
area. (IWMI uses international prices to value
crops; here, local prices have been used, which
appear to be somewhat below world prices).
The values calculated are well within the
range of other values obtained in IWMI’s studies,
and are consistent with the observed trends
elsewhere. Rice, for example, shows poor
returns per unit of water delivered due to the
high requirements for field preparation and
percolation, but high values per unit of water
consumed (emphasizing how essential it is to
evaluate “losses” in assessing the desirability of
rice cropping).
Present water charges, applied volumetrically
at the current rate of Rial 20 per m
3, would
amount to $30–40 for wheat, barley and maize,
and $90 for rice. In each case, this value is
about 5 percent of total revenue, and less than
10 percent of net revenues—significant, but
small in relation to the overall crop budget.
The Impact of Charges on Water
Demand
These values provide a useful guide to evaluate
the importance of water charges at present, the
attractiveness of new technologies, the
incentives facing the farmer, and the implications
for water use.
To simplify the discussion, we focus on
typical values, rather than the ranges and
extremes, which have been calculated above.
We assume that
· the present price of water is $0.004 per m
3
· the cost of reducing water deliveries through
improved technology is $0.10 per m
312
· the net value of water delivered to farmers is
$0.05 per m
3
· the net value of water consumed by the crop
is $0.08 per m
3
The first two values indicate that volumetric
pricing in any form, in the absence of much
higher water charges, will have very little impact
on farmers’ choice of crop or choice of irrigation
technology.
More detailed consideration of the last two
values provides important insights into what can
happen if water charges are substantially raised,
or if water allocations to farms are physically
limited below potential demand (for example, if
water deliveries were restricted to 15,000 m
3 per
ha in rice areas, or 5,000 m
3 per ha in non-rice
areas).
Note that the value of water consumed is
comparable to the cost of reducing deliveries
through improved technology. Put another way, if
the farmers switch to (say) drip irrigation, and
avoid the flows to drains and groundwater that
currently occur, they can consume a higher
proportion of the water delivered to his farm.
Each farmer’s benefit is $0.08 per m
3 at present
levels of productivity, and the cost to each is
$0.10 per m
3. But conversion to drip or sprinkler
may also be accompanied by higher yields
(better water control) and perhaps a shift to
higher-value crops such as fruits and vegetables.
The impact of this would be a desirable
increase in productivity of land, an increase in
the volume of water consumed at the farm level,
and a decrease in return flows to drains and
aquifers. The latter points are crucial. Improved
crop growth and yield are almost invariably
associated with an increase in transpiration, so
we can be quite sure that one of the “uses” of
water will increase. If the return flows were not
recoverable, the implications for downstream
users of the increase in transpiration will be
neutral—deliveries to the upstream area were in
any case a reduction in flows available to the
downstream users. If, however, the return flows
were recoverable downstream, the new situation
is that upstream consumption increases, return
flows decrease, and downstream users
experience reduced availability of water as a
result of improved upstream “efficiency”!
Of course, the new situation offers the
possibility of reducing deliveries to the upstream
users (who are now getting increased production
by “capturing” more beneficial use of the water
delivered to their farms). The question then
arises as to whether upstream users will wish to
invest in improved technology if their water
TABLE 3.
Value of water for major crops.
Crop Gross Net Total Net Gross value (¢/m
3) Gross value ($/m
3)
value of value of irrigation water delivered consumed delivered consumed




Wheat 704 538 8,286 6,800 0.085 0.104 0.065 0.079
Barley 500 358 8,286 6,800 0.060 0.074 0.043 0.053
Maize 500 325 11,214 7,900 0.045 0.063 0.029 0.041
Rice 1,604 938 21,714 9,200 0.074 0.173 0.043 0.102
Note: The water delivered is calculated as: (ET - Effective rainfall)/70 percent for maize, wheat and barley, and (ET - Effective rainfall + land
preparation and percolation)/70 percent for rice. The ratio of 70 percent accounts for farm-level efficiency. This is the relevant figure, as
investments in on-farm improvements can only effect efficiency at this level.13
allocation is in consequence reduced, and the
savings from their investments are passed to
others.
The Issue of Salt
The water in the Zayandeh river contains a
natural salt load. As the water is diverted for
irrigation, and any excess water returns to the
river, the downstream salt load increases,
reduces, or stays constant, as described below.
Whether changes in the salt load are desirable
or not depends on local and basin-level
objectives. In considering this issue it is
essential to distinguish between the salt load,
and the salt concentration at any given point of
measurement.
Suppose the annual water supply released
from the dam for downstream use is 100 million
cubic meters (Mm
3), and the salt concentration
is 500 ppm. Then the total salt load delivered
from the dam is 50,000 t per yr., and the first
downstream irrigation project diverts 50 Mm
3.
Case 1
If 80 percent of the diverted water is consumed
by crops, and the unconsumed water is just
sufficient to carry out all the incoming salt to the
river in the return flow, then:
· The downstream flow is 60 Mm
3.
· The downstream concentration is increased
to 833 ppm.
· The downstream salt load is 50,000 t per yr.
· No salt is accumulating in the irrigated area.
Case 2
If the entire volume of water is consumed by
irrigation, so that there are no return flows to the
river, then
· The downstream flow is 50 Mm
3 per yr.
· The downstream concentration is unchanged
at 500 ppm.
· The downstream salt load is 25,000 t per yr.
· In this area, 25,000 t per yr. of salt are
accumulating.
Case 3
As in Case 1, except that the soils in the
irrigated area are saline, and the return flows
pick up a further amount of salt equal to that
delivered in the incoming irrigation water:
· The downstream flow is 60 Mm
3.
· The downstream concentration is increased
to 1,250 ppm.
· The downstream salt load is 75,000 t per yr.
· From the project area 25,000 t per yr. of salt
are being removed.
There are, of course, an infinite variety of
such possibilities, and there is likely to be
variation within individual projects. Further, these
scenarios change over time; land that is irrigated
for the first time may often correspond to Case
3, but over time, as the salt is leached from the
profile, it moves towards Case 1.
These alternative local scenarios and
downstream impacts have implications for
government objectives in water management,
and the impact of farmers’ efforts in response to
water charges or changed technology.
In Case 1, the local area is kept salt-free,
and the salt load in the river is constant, to the
detriment of downstream users. Case 2
represents the case of more “efficient” irrigation,
and leaves the downstream water quality
unchanged, but threatens the sustainability of14
Conclusions
irrigation in the hypothetical upstream project as
salt builds up in the area. Case 3 is the
reverse—the upstream area is improving while
the salt load downstream is sharply increased. It
is clear from these examples that irrigation
“efficiency” and productive, sustainable irrigation
have no precise relationship, and that the
optimum “efficiency” must be locally defined in
relation to impacts in the area concerned and
elsewhere. The implications for a pricing policy
as a tool in this environment are obscure.
An Alternative Approach to Improving Productivity
It is striking that many of the issues identified
above must be analyzed in terms of volumes of
water. The water available is a volume, and how
it is used (through crop ET, to groundwater, to
drains) are all volumes, and the salt balance is
based on water and salt volumes and their
spatial and temporal distribution.
It is also relatively easy to define sustainable
irrigation in terms of the water that should be
applied, water that should (or should not) return
to the system, and water that should go to
groundwater to maintain sustainable balances in
each area. It is also easiest to define the
political economy of water in terms of allocations
of water to areas, groups, or individuals.
And finally, it is important to note that the
incentives to utilize water productively are made
clear to the farmer just as directly by rationing
water as by trying to establish an appropriate
system of water charges. In northwest India, the
long-tested warabandi irrigation system (Malhotra
1982) is based entirely on ensuring an equitable
distribution (over the land) of limited water
resources. Water charges are not high, and not
volumetric, but because all farmers are water-
short, they experiences directly the true value of
their water ration, and strive to save every drop
and maximize its productivity.
m
3, while the charge required to substantially
affect demand would be much higher—perhaps
$0.02–0.05 per m
3. This indicates that a charge
designed to meet the cost recovery objective will
have minimal efficiency impact and that a charge
that meets the efficiency objective will recover
far more than the costs of O&M, which seems
attractive.
However, water is a complicated natural
resource:
The apparent misuse and waste of irrigation
water, especially in the context of low and
subsidized prices for water and deterioration of
irrigation systems, suggest that charges should
be increased to cover the costs of system
operation, and that pricing mechanisms should
have a prominent role in encouraging more
efficient resource use.
The analysis above and data from other
countries suggest that the likely charge needed
to cover O&M costs would be $0.003–0.005 per15
· It is difficult to allocate and measure,
especially in large surface systems with many
small farmers—indeed it is rare to find even
simple proportional allocations being
achieved, with head-end farmers (and
projects) usually getting more water than tail
enders.
· The nature and extent of actual losses are
rarely easy to assess, due to reuse and
recycling locally and downstream. The extent
to which “savings” will be achieved through
water charges or changes in technology can
only be assessed through a full accounting of
water flows in the basin.
· The salt load that is found in every basin
complicates the analysis of water distribution
and consumption considerably, due to
conflicts between “on-site” objectives of
avoiding the accumulation of salt, and
downstream impacts of concentrated salt
loads.
Water is also a complicated economic resource:
· Its value varies sharply across time, space
and use.
· Its value in irrigation is generally a large
multiple of its cost, but the cost of “saving”
water as a source of extra water is very
expensive.
And water is a complicated political resource:
· Farmers are often an important political
constituency, and strongly resist increases in
the price of irrigation services.
· The level of price increases that would be
required to have a significant impact on
demand (for example, by a factor of 5–10)
would be politically very difficult to enforce.
· The level of water prices that would induce
changes in demand would result in
substantial profits to the supplying agency,
which would present a further political
difficulty.
In sum, introducing volumetric water charges
is difficult and unlikely to result in water savings
within the politically feasible range of prices—and
introducing charges at a lower rate will have no
impact on demand, but will significantly increase
the costs of irrigation services. And the “correct”
price structure to balance supply and demand will
not be the “correct” price structure required to
meet environmental needs, and also will not be
the “correct” price to meet socio-political needs.
Many of the assumed advantages of water
pricing can be achieved through physical rationing
of water, which is also easier to implement and
administer, more transparent, and more readily
adjusted to meet local considerations such as
rising or falling groundwater conditions and salt
management. For Iran, as in many other countries,
uniform water allocations per hectare would
achieve some very important steps in the
reallocation of water from overusing upstream
areas, where groundwater is also relatively fresh
and abundant, to the water-short and salt-
abundant downstream area. Such an approach
would also be politically easier to explain than
resorting to water charges, especially (as is all too
likely) if charges are set well below “value” so that
a) farmers upstream will buy even more than they
now get and b) they will have no incentive to
invest in productivity-enhancing technologies.
This suggests that it may be more productive
(at least in the short run) to set water charges so
as to ensure financial sustainability of the
irrigation systems—that is, to recover full O&M
costs. The objective of increased water use
efficiency will be better served by volumetric
allocation of water rather than expecting markets
to achieve the desired balance among competing
objectives in production, environment, and social
equity.1617
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